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CONSORTIUM CLAIMS INVOLVING CHILDREN:
SHOULD COLORADO CONTINUE AN ARCHAIC





In a tort system premised upon economic compensation for per-
sonal injuries, a child's rights are difficult to define. Under basic tort
principles, one who is injured by a negligent tortfeasor is entitled to
recover for pain and suffering, loss of wages and medical expenses. This
is the rule of recovery in most modern jurisdictions except when, by
happenstance, the victim is married in which case an additional category
of recovery called consortium is recognized. A consortium action allows
the non-injured spouse to sue for the intangible losses resulting from his
or her deprivation of the affection, society, companionship and aid of
the injured spouse. Within the last fifteen years, a minority of jurisdic-
tions have extended the consortium claim to the parent-child relation-
ship. This Article examines the claims of filial consortium (a parent's
claims for a negligently injured child) and parental consortium (a child's
claims for a negligently injured parent). It tracks the development of
consortium at common law and through statutory enactments as the
roles of husband, wife and child have evolved. This Article will conclude
by contending that Colorado should refuse to expand the consortium
concept to the parent-child relationship because to do so merely per-
petuates archaic beliefs of Victorian England, stretches tort law beyond
its intended boundaries and adversely impacts the present tort system.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW
A. The Spousal Consortium Claim and the Master-Servant Analogy
At common law, when a servant was tortiously injured, the master
possessed a cause of action for lost services.I While the servant had a
claim for his injuries, the master's claim was independent and in the
* John M. Palmeri, Partner, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado; A.B. 1981
Columbia University; J.D. 1984 University of Denver.
** Christopher P. Kenney, Associate, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado;
B.A. 1986 University of Colorado; J.D. 1990 University of Denver. The authors wish to
thank Joseph Cachey and Joseph King for their research and editorial work on the article.
I. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 931
(5th ed. 1984) (citingJohn H. Wigmore, Interference With Social Relations, 21 AM. L. REv. 764
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master's own right. 2 This rule was a holdover from the feudal relation-
ship between serf and lord.3 The master's claim was based on the gen-
eral principle of the common law that where a person sustains loss or
damage through the wrong of another, he has an action to be remuner-
ated for that loss in damages. 4 Because the servant owed to the master
the duty of his service or labor, 5 it followed that the master was entitled
to recover for the loss of services or expenses incurred as a result of the
servant's injury. 6 At common law, a wife's relationship to her husband
was similar to the relationship of the servant to his master in that the
wife had a duty to provide her husband service or labor.7 Because the
common law viewed the wife as her husband's servant, with no status to
sue on her own behalf, when a married woman was injured, the husband
sued for the damages and joined his wife in the action. 8 By 1619, the
master's cause of action for the services of his injured servant had ex-
tended to allow a husband's independent recovery for lost services
caused by an injury to his wife.
In Guy v. Livesey, 9 a husband failed to join his wife in an action for
damages arising from the defendant's assault and battery on both
spouses. The defendant argued that the husband could not recover for
the damage done to the wife unless she was joined in the action.10 The
court disagreed, holding that the husband had an independent action
since "he lost the company of his wife, which is only a damage and loss
to himself .... "I I The court further reasoned by analogy that because a
master has a valid cause of action for the loss of his servant's service, a
husband should similarly have such a cause of action. 12 Thus, the claim
for loss of consortium was born.
Although initially a pecuniary claim, consortium soon began to en-
compass intangible elements such as society, affection, conjugal rela-
tions, companionship and sexual relations.13 The reasoning behind
expanding the consortium claim in this manner appears in numerous
decisions from the late 1800s 14 in which courts presented this extension
as a self-evident, pre-existing right rooted in the common law principle
that the husband not only is entitled to loss of services, but also intangi-
ble losses unique to the marital relationship. Many courts determined
that when an injury infringed the husband's right to companionship, he
2. Joseph H. Radensky, The Child's Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium-The Prospects
for the Nineties (The Decade ofa Kinder, Gentler Society?), 17 W. ST. U.L. REV. 277, 281 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Blair v. Chicago & At. Ry., I S.W. 367 (Mo. 1886).
5. Selleck v. City of Janesville, 80 N.W. 944, 946 (Wis. 1899).
6. Blair, I S.W. at 368.
7. Selleck, 80 N.W. at 946.
8. Radensky, supra note 2, at 282.




13. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 125 at 931; Radensky, supra note 2, at 282.
14. David P. Dwork, Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of,4 Parents Love, Care and
Companionship Caused By Tortious Ijury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L. REV. 722, 724 n.22 (1976).
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was entitled to compensation for loss of such right. 15 For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Selleck v. City of Janesville stated:
[f]rom before the days of Blackstone down to the present time,
... the husband's recovery is for the loss or impairment of his
right to conjugal society and assistance, and ordinarily, where
the word 'services' is used, it signifies wifely services, such as
are due from her, and includes the idea of her society.'
6
By the late nineteenth century nearly all American jurisdictions had
passed Married Women's Acts. 17 These so-called "emancipation stat-
utes," which allowed married women to sue and own property in their
own name, cleared the way for the recognition of a wife's claim for lost
consortium.I 8 No longer was a wife seen as merely an appendage of her
husband. It was not until the 1949 decision, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 19
however, that a court first recognized that both husband and wife were
entitled to the comfort, companionship and affection of the other.
20
Plaintiff, Lucia Hitaffer, brought an action against her husband's em-
ployer to recover for her loss of consortium. Her husband had sus-
tained severe permanent injuries to his abdomen while in the employ of
the defendant. Plaintiff's husband received compensation for his inju-
ries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and was therefore barred from suing his
employer. Ms. Hitaffer, however, initiated a claim in her own right for
loss of her husband's aid, assistance, enjoyment and sexual relations.
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis
that plaintiff's consortium claim failed to state a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted. 2 1 The Federal Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed, holding there was no substantial rationale on
which the court could predicate a denial of a wife's action for loss of
consortium due to her husband's injury.2 2 The primary basis for the
court's decision was that a husband already had a cognizable action for
consortium and therefore, the medieval concept that a husband is
master should not survive in the "enlightened day and age" of 1949.23
The court noted that marriage gives each spouse the same rights and
therefore both are entitled to the comfort, companionship and affection
of the other, not only as a natural right, but as a legal right arising from
the marital relationship. 24 Thus, while noting that medieval and anti-
quated concepts should not be furthered, the court expanded a right of
recovery based on just such an arcane theory.
15. Furnish v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 15 S.W. 315, 316-17 (Mo. 1891); Kelley v. New
York N.H. & H. R.R., 46 N.E. 1063, 1063 (Mass. 1897); Selleck v. City ofJanesville, 80
N.W. 944, 946 (Wis. 1899).
16. Selleck, 80 N.W. at 946.
17. Dwork, supra note 14, at 725 n.28.
18. Id. at 725.
19. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
20. 183 F.2d at 816.
21. Id. at 812.
22. Id. at 813.
23. Id. at 819.
24. Id. at 817-18.
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B. Expansion to the Parent-Child Relationship
In the mid-1970s and beyond, law review commentators began call-
ing for expansion of the consortium action to the parent-child relation-
ship both in the form of filial consortium and parental consortium. 25 It
was also during this time that courts began wrestling with the
cognizability of parental and filial consortium claims. 26 At least with re-
spect to the parental consortium claim, the expansionists had history on
their side. From feudal times through the industrial revolution, a child
was an economic asset to the family and often worked outside the home
to contribute to the family economy. Thus, the common law considered
children in the same way that it considered wives, as servants of the fa-
ther or husband. The father, entitled to the services of the child, could
recover for lost services or earning capacity when the child was tor-
tiously injured.2 7 A father was further entitled to recover for the child's
medical expenses. 28 With the institution of child labor laws, however,
children became a financial burden to the family unit thereby decreasing
the importance of a father's right to recovery for services.2 9 At no time
prior to 1980, however, did the claim for the loss of the child's services
expand to include recovery for intangible losses such as companionship,
aid and comfort. Thus, within the context of modern society, the parent
was equipped with what was essentially an inconsequential claim for lost
services when his or her child was negligently injured. Historically,
given that the child was viewed as a servant, he or she had no expecta-
tion of recovery for the negligent injury of a parent. Because the injured
parent could recover for all economic losses, it was thought that the
child's interest would be adequately protected, albeit indirectly.
3 0
Therefore, until recently, the right of recovery within the parent-child
relationship was viewed as strictly pecuniary in nature.
In 1979, twenty-five years after the first judicial decision granting a
wife's right to recovery for loss of consortium, a major step was taken
concerning the same right within the context of the parent-child rela-
tionship. In Shockley v. Prier,3 ' the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled
existing precedent and held that the parents of a blinded and disfigured
25. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note I at 934-39 (1984);Jean C. Love, Tortious Inter-
ference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51
IND. L.J. 590 (1976); Radensky, supra note 2; Mary Lee Tayrien, Note, The Child's Claim for
Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231
(1975); Dwork, supra note 14; Shirley S. Simpson, Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society
and Companionship Resulting from the Negligent Injury of a Child: a Proposal for Arizona?, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (1980); William F. Ellis, Note, Expanding Loss of Consortium in Vermont:
Developing a New Doctrine, 12 VT. L. REV. 157 (1987); Nancy Wanderer Mackenzie, Note,
Aaine Refuses to Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium: Durepo v. Fishman, 41
ME. L. REV. 165 (1988); Marilyn S. Duncan, Comment, Davis v. Elizabeth General Medical
Center:" Loss of Consortium in the Parent-Child Relationship, 43 ARK. L. REV. 405 (1990).
26. See infra note 35 (parental consortium claims); infra note 36 (filial consortium
claims).
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note i, at 934.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 947.
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note I, at 934.
31. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
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infant could maintain an action for loss of aid, comfort, society and com-
panionship. The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent to refuse
recovery for filial consortium due to a nonfatal injury when Wisconsin
law by statute allowed such recovery for a child's death.
3 2
Shortly after the Shockley decision, three more jurisdictions judicially
recognized parental consortium claims.3 3 Today, twelve jurisdictions
recognize the claim for parental consortium, 34 while eleven recognize
filial consortium claims.3 5 These cases generally acknowledge that ex-
pansion of consortium to the parent-child relationship is a logical pro-
gression from the starting point of spousal consortium. For instance,
sharing love, companionship, society, comfort and affection character-
izes both the husband-wife and parent-child relationships.3 6 With re-
spect to filial consortium, some courts note that the modern relationship
between parent and child is, or should be, closer than the relationship
between master and servant.3 7 "The origins of the pecuniary loss limi-
tation 'are rooted in Charles Dickens'[s] England'."3 8 Moreover, these
courts often analogize parental-child consortium to wrongful death
cases in which nonpecuniary damages are allowed. 39 "[I]t would be
anomalous to take the position that, if a child is injured, but does not
die, the parents may not recover."' 40 Commentators have argued that
the need to compensate the parent's loss may be even greater in cases of
severe injury because the injury continually reminds them of their
loss.4 1 Courts have supported their decisions by citing constitutional
concerns protecting the family unit, arguing that the right to associate
with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by state
32. Id. at 499.
33. See Weiti v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audibon-Extra Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois C.G.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983) (l"eitl was overruled on
grounds other than the recognition of a parental consortium claim); Ferrieter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. 1981).
34. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1989); Villareal v.
State Dept. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); IWeill, 311 N.W.2d 159; Ferriter, 413
N.E.2d 690; Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804
S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E. 2d 830 (W.
Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gilette-
Campbell CountyJoint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
35. Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. 1985); Yorden v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla.
1973); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989); Dymek v. Nyquist, 469
N.E.2d 659 (Ill. App. 1984); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Medical Ctr., 548 A.2d 528 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div.); First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware, 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988);
Noruel v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 463 N.E.2d Ill (Ohio App. 1983); Hall v. Birchfield,
718 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App. 1986), red., 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987); Shockley v. Prier,
225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
36. Simpson, supra note 25, at 922.
37. Shocklev, 225 N.W.2d at 500.
38. Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 26 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
39. See, e.g., .1Iasaki, 780 P.2d at 577; Frank v. Superior Ct., 722 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz.
1987) (en banc); Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 498.
40. .1lasaki, 780 P.2d at 577.
41. See, e.g.. Simpson, supra note 25, at 923.
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and federal constitutions. 4 2
Despite these arguments, the majority of American jurisdictions
continue to disallow claims for parental and filial consortium. Twenty-
seven jurisdictions have expressly rejected parental consortium
claims,4 3 while numerous others have rejected filial claims.4 4 Courts
have denied these claims for various reasons, the most often cited being:
(1) adoption of the right to such claims is properly a legislative function;
(2) increased litigation through multiple claims; (3) possibility of double
recovery; (4) difficulty in assessing damages; (5) inherent differences in
the spousal and parent-child relationships; (6) potential expansion to
distant relatives; and (7) increased societal costs in the form of insurance
and expenses of litigation. 4 5 The merit of these arguments has been the
subject of considerable commentary and, as noted below, has been
criticized.
III. COLORADO LAW
A. The Spousal Consortium Claim and the Master-Servant Analogy
Until 1874, married women in Colorado had no legal existence.
46
This was a holdover from the common law view that a wife was a hus-
band's servant and had no separate legal identity. 4 7 As noted by the
Colorado Supreme Court, this legal theory derived from the view that
marriage made a husband and wife one person.4 8 A husband was there-
fore seated "as the head and governor of the family." '49 He had control
of his wife, her property, children and labor.50 In fact, a husband's con-
trol was so pervasive at common law that he possessed "by law power
and dominion over his wife, and may keep her by force within the
bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel man-
ner." 5 1 The 1868 enactment of the "Act Concerning Married Wo-
men" 5 2 emancipated a wife in Colorado from the condition of thraldom
42. Nulle v. Gillete-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173
(Wyo. 1990) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). See also Villareal v. State
Dept. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989).
43. For a list of such cases, see Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1133, n.2 (Okla.
1990); see also Donald D. Schneider, Loss of Parental Consortium, FOR THE DEFENSE, August
1991 at 11; moreover, some commentators have agreed with this view; see, e.g., Don E.
Burrell, Note, Parental Consortium: A House Built on Sand, 58 UMKC L. REv. 145 (1989); Greg
A. Guthrie, Comment, Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Con-
sortium?, 28 DuQ. L. REv. 697 (1990).
44. See Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Parent's Right to Recover for Loss of Consortium in
Connection with Injury to Child, 54 A.L.R. 4th 112 (1987).
45. The seminal decisions advancing public policy concerns to support the rejection
of such claims include: Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977)(en
banc)(parental consortium claim); Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977) (fil-
ial consortium claim).
46. Schuler v. Henry, 94 P. 360 (Colo. 1908).
47. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1887).
48. Schuler, 94 P. at 360.
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. This act, originally codified at R. S. 1868, ch. LX, § 3, is now codified at COLO.
486 [Vol. 69:3
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in which she was placed at common law. 53 This act granted to the wife
many essential rights but had no effect on the rule denying her the right
to sue for consortium.
In the late 1800s, Colorado recognized that the consortium concept
included the right to recover for various intangible losses. In Denver
Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Riley, 54 the Colorado Court of Appeals rea-
soned that compensation for pecuniary loss resulting from a wife's in-
ability to continue to perform household duties does not, by itself, fully
compensate a husband's loss. 5 5 A wife makes a husband's "home cheer-
ful and inviting, and ministers to his happiness in a multitude of ways
outside of the drudgery of household labor .... All the work of the
house may be done by hired employees, and her services still give char-
acter to the home."' 56 The court recognized the intangible nature of a
consortium award, but reasoned that ajury could capably determine the
amount, not from evidence of value, but from their own observation,
experience and knowledge.
57
Thus, by 1899, Colorado's definition of consortium came to include
society and companionship. 58 Until 1970, however, a married woman
was not allowed to bring an action for loss of consortium based on inju-
ries to her husband. The justification for this denial of a right to sue for
loss of consortium was two-fold. First, this right of action was not recog-
nized under the common law. Second, statutes that allowed women to
sue on their own behalf did not specifically create the consortium right.
Accordingly, the courts held that the action could not be maintained
without legislative grant. 59 The Colorado legislature subsequently en-
acted Colorado Revised Statute (C.R.S.) § 90-2-11 in 1961, which codi-
fied a woman's right for consortium. 60 This enactment led to the 1970
decision, Crouch v. West, 6 1 wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals held
that the enactment of C.R.S. § 90-2-11 expressly overruled the denial of
the wife's right to sue for loss of consortium. The court also held that a
wife's right was "a separate right similar to that held by married men."
'62
Today, like the vast majority of jurisdictions, 63 Colorado recognizes
REV. STAT. § 14-2-202 (1987) and provides: "Any woman, while married, may sue and be
sued, in all matters having relation to her property, person, or reputation, in the same
manner as if she were sole."
53. Vells, 3 Colo. at 493.
54. 59 P. 476 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899).




59. Franzen v. Zimmerman, 256 P.2d 897, 898 (Colo. 1953); Giggey v. Gallagher
Transp. Co., 72 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Colo. 1937).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 90-2-11 (1963), which is now codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2-209 (1987), and provides: "In all actions for tort by a married woman, she shall
have the same right to recover for loss of consortium of her husband as is afforded hus-
bands in like actions."
61. 477 P.2d 805 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
62. Id. at 806.
63. Five American jurisdictions do not recognize a claim for loss of spousal consor-
tium. See Carey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963) (holding that the Married
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
both spouses' right to recover for lost consortium. Under current Colo-
rado law, consortium encompasses "noneconomic damages in the form
of loss of affection, society, companionship, and aid and comfort of the
injured spouse, and ... economic damages in the form of lost household
services the injured spouse would have performed .. "64
B. Direct Actions by Parents and Children
Although consortium recovery has not been expanded to the par-
ent-child relationship in Colorado, a negligently injured child's parent is
not without a form of recovery. In Colorado, when a child is negli-
gently, but not fatally, injured the parent can recover pecuniary loss in
the form of reasonable medical expenses, 65 the child's past and future
earnings 66 and lost services. 6 7 The right to recover for injuries sus-
tained by a child lies exclusively with the parent. Furthermore, when a
parent is negligently injured, the child has no independent cause of ac-
tion under the theory that the child's economic loss will be compensated
in the parent's own action. Burdsall v. Waggoner6 8 is one of the first Colo-
rado cases to expressly rule that "the father is entitled to the earnings of
his son during minority."'6 9 The court noted that the father may relin-
quish the right to claim the wages when "such minor son contracts on
his own account for his services, and the father knows of it and makes no
objection." 70 Under such circumstances "there is an implied assent that
the son shall be entitled to his earnings." 7 ' In Burdsall, the issue arose
as to whether the son was entitled to the purchase price of a lot that he
had earned as wages during his minority. Because he had lived away
from home without parental control, earning his own living with his fa-
Women's Act divested the husband of his common law right of recovery for loss of consor-
tium as a result of his wife's disabilities caused by negligently inflicted injury, and the wife
should not be exclusive treasurer of the right to recover for consortium); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 388 P.2d 615 (Kan. 1965) (citing the standard drawbacks to any loss of consortium
award, including indefinite nature and amount of damages and possible double recovery
based on an award to the husband as justification for holding that the common law stands
until it has been specifically overruled or modified by the legislature); Roseberry v.
Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321 (N.M. 1963) (deciding not to endorse the right due to uncertain
and indefinite nature of the recovery; the general and communal nature of the recovery;
possibilities of double recovery; the fact that the legislature had not seen fit to speak on the
subject); Cozart v. Chapin, 241 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1978) (holding that no cause of action for
loss of consortium survived the transfer effected by North Carolina's Married Woman's
Act of a husband's common law right of action to recover for the wife's services); Hackford
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) (relying on previous Utah decisions
which held that the common law cause of action for loss of consortium had been abolished
in Utah by the Married Women's Act of 1898, and stating that if the cause of action were to
be created anew, it should be done by the legislature).
64. COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Civ. 3d § 6:6 (1988) [hereinafter CJI].
65. Id. at 6:3.
66. Burdsall v. Waggoner, 4 Colo. 261 (1878); Pawnee Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Pow-
ell, 227 P. 836, 839 (Colo. 1924); CJI, supra note 65, at § 6:3.
67. Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 300 P. 606 (Colo. 1931); CJI, supra note 65, at
§ 6:3.
68. 4 Colo. 261 (1878).





ther's full knowledge and consent, he was essentially emancipated. He
was therefore legally and justly entitled in his own right to his wages,
which were applied to the purchase price of the property.
7 2
In Pawnee Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Powell 73 a father brought an action
as his minor's next friend rather than joining as an individual plaintiff.
The court noted that there could be no recovery for the amount of the
minor's lost wages since the father was not a plaintiff in the action.
74
According to the court, the minor had a cause of action in his own name
for the injuries he sustained, but it was exclusively the father who was
entitled to recover for the minor's lost earnings. 7 5 The rules set forth in
Burdsall and Pawnee are the present state of the law in Colorado regard-
ing direct actions by parents and children, although, as noted below,
attempts were made to broaden those actions.
C. Parental and Filial Claims in Colorado
By the early 1980s, as courts began recognizing parental-filial con-
sortium claims, the stage seemed set for judicial acceptance in Colorado.
Spousal consortium claims had become a common form of recovery.
Moreover, both the judiciary and legislature recognized recovery for de-
rivative noneconomic loss, i.e. injury such as pain and suffering, incon-
venience, emotional stress and impairment of the quality of life.7 6
Furthermore, proponents of the claim found significance in Miller v.
Subia,77 often cited as a case that implicitly recognizes a filial consortium
claim. In Miller, a father brought an action on behalf of himself and his
minor son for damages arising from the son's automobile-motorcycle
accident. After a $1,000 jury award, the father appealed, contending
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on his entitlement
to damages for loss of companionship. The court of appeals affirmed,
finding no merit in the father's contention that the jury was not in-
structed on all elements of his damages. 78 The court did not specifically
rule on the validity of the father's consortium action. Rather, it merely
stated that there was inadequate evidence to support his claim. 79 For
many, Miller stood for the proposition that damages for filial consortium
could be recovered if adequately supported by the evidence.
Further inroads toward recognition were made in Reighley v. Interna-
tional Playtex, Inc. 8 0 In this wrongful death action, the district court af-
firmed the right of children to bring an independent claim for loss of
parental consortium and companionship. Stephen Reighley sued the
72. Id.
73. 227 P. 836 (Colo. 1924).
74. Id. at 839.
75. Id.
76. See Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978)(en banc)(recognizing the
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102.5(3)(a)(1987).
77. 514 P.2d 79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (N.S.F.O.P.).
78. Id. at 80.
79. Id.
80. 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985).
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defendant individually and on behalf of his two minor children for inju-
ries resulting in the death of his wife as a result of "toxic shock" caused
by the defendant's product. The defendant sought partial summary
judgment seeking dismissal of the children's claim for loss of consor-
tium. The Reighley decision, however, came four years before the enact-
ment of C.R.S. § 13-21-203, allowing a spouse or heir to recover for
nonpecuniary damages such as loss of consortium in wrongful death
claims. The Reighley court conducted an analysis of parental consortium
case law from other jurisdictions. The court found cases supporting the
cause of action to be persuasive and additionally noted "the family unit
has been recognized by the Supreme Court to bear constitutionaly pro-
tected aspects." 8' The court further opined that Colorado tort law had
"evolved by legislation and judicial decision to impose duties and liabili-
ties on individual conduct interfering with the family relationship."
82
This includes the judicial recognition of the spousal consortium claim
83
as well as the child's right to a secure home environment as manifested
in the preamble to Colorado's Children's Code. 84 The court noted that
"[f]or the state to declare its responsibility to protect and foster the par-
ent-child relationship in this context and to ignore it when a third party
negligently injures the family unit is too anomalous to be counte-
nanced." 8 5 The court dismissed concerns about multiple suits, unlim-
ited liability and the difficulty of calculating damages as knee-jerk
reactions that arise each time a new cause of action is considered.
86
Moreover, if a spouse is entitled to recover for loss of consortium and a
parent is allowed to recover for the intangible loss sustained due to the
negligent death of a child, "[t]he child's loss of parental consortium is
no more intangible .... -87 The court adopted certain guidelines set
forth by other jurisdictions for the management and determination of
these actions, including joinder, wherever feasible, of the child's claim
with that of the parent and a requisite showing that the minor child was
dependent on the deceased parent for both economic and emotional
support.8 8
81. Id. at 1081, citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But see Dearborn
Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990) (reversing a lower
court ruling that recognized a claim for parental consortium. The Indiana Supreme Court
noted that recognizing the claim would only invite defendants to minimize its validity by
proving inadequacies in the familial relationship, resulting in pretrial investigation attack-
ing the quality of parent-child relationship enjoyed by the child before the parent's inju-
ries, and these attacks could lead to children suffering significant emotional harm from the
litigation process).
82. Reighlev, 604 F. Supp. at 1081.
83. Id.
84. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-101 to 116 (1986), which provides in part that the pur-
poses of the Children's Code are to "secure for each child . . . such care and guidance,
preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society; [and]
[t]o preserve and strengthen family ties . . . including improvement of home environ-
ment." Id. at § 19-1-102(l)(a) & (b).
85. Reighle', 604 F. Supp. at 1083-84.
86. Id. at 1082.
87. Id. at 1082-83.
88. Id. at 1084.
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D. Lee v. Colorado Department of Health
The uncertainty surrounding parental-filial consortium claims in
non-fatal injury cases in Colorado appeared to end with the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health.89 In Lee,
an injured driver's five children joined their father's suit and requested
an award of damages for their loss of companionship and support result-
ing from the father's injury in the car accident. The supreme court up-
held the trial court's determination that the children's claims were not
cognizable under Colorado law. Chief Justice Joseph A. Quinn, writing
for a unanimous court, recited the standard difficulties with recognizing
the claim, including: efficacy of monetary compensation as a substitute
for companionship and guidance; intangible character of the loss; socie-
tal costs and risk of double recovery. 90 Moreover, the court noted that
the legislature was in the best position to determine the viability of the
claim.9 ' Without reference to the modem trend, the Reighley opinion or
views of legal scholars and commentators, the Colorado Supreme Court
left little doubt that the claims for parental consortium, and by analogy,
filial consortium, were not judicially recognized in Colorado.
E. Post-Lee v. Colorado Department of Health Developments
On the heels of Lee, the district court also retreated from the
Reighley opinion, holding that under Colorado law a minor had no in-
dependent right of action to recover for loss of parental consortium in a
wrongful death action.9 2 In Beikman v. International Playtex, Inc., Judge
Jim R. Carrigan held that in light of Lee, any reform within the context of
parental consortium claims would have to await legislative action. 9 3 It is
obvious from Judge Carrigan's opinion, however, that he favors the
child's right to recover for parental consortium. Labelling the modern
trend of authority "the more persuasive cases,"'94 Judge Carrigan rea-
soned that the child's need for protection under the law is even greater
than a spouse's, since the spouse is more able to fend for himself or
herself.9 5
Another significant development in the parental-filial consortium
controversy occurred in 1989 when the Colorado General Assembly
amended the wrongful death statute9 6 to permit a surviving party's re-
covery for noneconomic loss, including grief, loss of companionship,
89. 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
90. Id. at 233.
91. Id. at 234. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Kansas Supreme
Court's reasoning for denying a child's claim for loss of consortium in Hoffman v. Dautel,
368 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1962). The Colorado court cited the Kansas court's decision in Hoffman
for denial of the consortium claim due to "[tihe possibility of multiplicity of actions based
upon a single tort and one physical injury, when added to the double-recovery aspect of
such situation in the absence of some statutory control . I..." d. at 234.
92. Beikman v. International Playtex, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 255 (D. Colo. 1987).
93. Id. at 259.
94. Id. at 258.
95. Id.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-201 to 204 (1987).
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY L1 W REVIEW
pain and suffering and emotional stress. 9 7 Although the enactment of
similar provisions in other jurisdictions may have provided an analogy
for compensating familial consortium claims for personal injuries, these
provisions were not often construed as pronouncements by the legisla-
ture that damages for lost consortium could be recovered in nonfatal
cases. This is similarly true in Colorado where the wrongful death stat--
ute and its amendments do not create new causes of action; rather, they
merely allow causes already recognized to survive death. 98 Because Col-
orado does not recognize filial and parental consortium claims under
the auspices of Lee, it is doubtful that the wrongful death statute and the
amendments thereto could logically be construed to create a new action
in nonfatal cases.
The Colorado Court of Appeals was asked recently to consider the
propriety of the Lee decision in McGee v. Hyatt Legal Services, Inc.99 The
McGee plaintiffs, a mother and her daughter, charged that the negligence
of the Hyatt law firm caused temporary custody orders to be issued con-
trary to the mother's wish for sole legal custody, and as a result, there
was a wrongful interference with her parental relationship. Citing Lee v.
Department of Health, the court rejected the claim, because of the impossi-
bility of ascertaining whether any tangible damages were or would be
sustained by the mother because of the custodial order. l0 0 Although
certiorari in McGee v. Hyatt was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court,
given the immense judicial attention the consortium claim has caused of
late, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the Colorado Supreme
Court should re-examine its decision not to extend consortium recovery
to the parent-child relationship.
IV. CRITIQUE OF COLORADO LAW
A critical analysis of Lee provides ample support for the proposition
that the court has not been intellectually honest in rejecting consortium
claims and that the basis for its decision is inherently flawed. As noted,
the primary reasons for the court's decision are the intangible character
of the loss, threats of double recovery and that legislative action is the
proper means by which extensions of law should be accomplished.'10
Courts and legal scholars have rejected these arguments, espousing
countervailing methods and considerations, which reveal Lee's flawed
analysis. 102
The double recovery argument in support of nonrecognition is that,
as a practical matter, the jury implicitly awards an amount of damages
for the impairment of the child-parent relationship when it considers its
award for the injured family member. To the extent that implicit recov-
97. 1989 COLO. SESS. LAws 752 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1991
Cum. Supp.)).
98. Id.
99. 813 P.2d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
100. Id. at 758.
101. See Guthrie, supra note 44, at 705.
102. See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
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ery presents a problem, it can be remedied by the use of narrowly tai-
lored jury instructions that distinguish between nonderivative pecuniary
loss and consortium damages. '0 3 "The specter of double recovery can
be easily eliminated by the trial court's distinctly specifying in proper
jury instructions the respective elements of damages to which the parent
and the child are each entitled."' 1 4 Moreover, there is a presumption
that the jury reads and follows its instructions. 10 5 This procedure is
used successfully in spousal claims. Parental-filial claims should pose no
greater problems.
The concern for multiple claims and protracted litigation can be
minimized by requiring joinder where feasible.l 0 6 The perceived threat
of multiple suits is primarily concerned with parental consortium claims
where numerous children seek recovery. It has been suggested that
there is no difference between these claims and tort claims involving nu-
merous victims such as bus accidents or airline accidents.' 0 7 Requiring
all children in a family to sue as a class would solve this problem.'
0 8
The intangible nature of the award seems to be an artificial distinc-
tion when state law compensates similar losses such as pain and suffer-
ing, spousal consortium, emotional distress and nonpecuniary loss in
wrongful death actions. 10 9 Thus, the same judicial rules which guide
the jury in these instances can be applied relative to parental-filial con-
sortium claims." l0 Along these lines it has been suggested that mone-
tary compensation will merely make the consortium deprived child or
parent a wealthy person rather than enabling them to regain the lost
companionship and guidance. II Proponents of consortium claims es-
chew this argument, claiming that although a monetary award may be a
poor substitute, it is the only workable way our legal system has found to
ease an injured party's tragic loss. 1 12 One court has expressly stated
that allowing such an award is preferable to complete denial.' IS
The Lee court additionally believed that recognition was best left to
the legislature.' 14 Causes of action for loss of consortium have histori-
cally been allowed or denied by common law.' 15 Courts have long rec-
ognized their responsibility to adapt common law to the needs of society
103. See, e.g., Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Colo. 1990); Belcher v. Goins,
400 S.E.2d 830, 838 (W. Va. 1990); Radensky, supra note 2, at 293-94.
104. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990).
105. Id.
106. See Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988), rev'd., 551 N.E.2d 1,135 (Ind. 1990); Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc.,
734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987); Nulle, 797 P.2d at 1175-76.
107. Simpson, supra note 25, at 925.
108. Love, supra note 25, at 604.
109. See Simpson, supra note 25, at 925.
110. Id.
Ill. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977).
112. Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Wis. 1984).
113. Id.
114. Lee, 718 P.2d at 234.
115. Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd., 551 N.E.2d 1135 (1990).
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when the legislature has not spoken. 16 As noted by one court, "when
the crowd is marching in the wrong direction, it is time to break ranks
and strike out on our own."'1 17 Deference to the legislature flies in the
face of the common law responsibilities of the judiciary. In all, there
exist well-reasoned rebuttals for the policy arguments set forth in Lee
and in other cases rejecting filial-spousal consortium claims. As previ-
ously noted, a majority of courts have had occasion to consider and deny
parental and filial claims and are no doubt aware of these countervailing
arguments. Why then are courts continuing to cling to the seemingly
"artificial" concerns of double recovery, multiple claims and intangible
recovery? What should Colorado's position be in this regard?
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Original Analogy to Master-Servant Should Not Be Extended
As noted above, spousal consortium recovery was based on an out-
dated and faulty premise that a woman was the servant of her husband
with no independent legal identity. The claim grew from this erroneous
idea when so-called enlightened courts recognized the fallacy of the hus-
band's role as master, but chose to demonstrate their enlightenment by
extending the consortium claim to the wife rather than eliminating it
altogether. As such, the consortium claim has been imbedded in legal
jurisprudence despite the archaic concept behind its early recognition.
Extending it to the parental-child relationship only perpetuates an aber-
ration in the law. The mere existence of a suspect form of recovery
should not be the basis for its unrestricted expansion. Thus, any anal-
ogy to the spousal claim is not persuasive, and parental and filial consor-
tium actions should not be recognized.
B. Basic Tort Principles and Costs To Society Should Be Considered
If the Colorado Supreme Court re-examines its position and does
not reverse Lee, it should be intellectually honest and acknowledge the
procedural mechanisms and considerations that exist to remedy the con-
cerns raised in Lee. It could be that the Lee court and other courts that
reject parental-filial claims are using these policy concerns in an attempt
to limit spiraling tort recovery for those not directly injured, but who
stand in a special relationship with the victim. Allowing secondary tort
victims to sue is somewhat of an idiosyncracy in the law, extending liabil-
ity from those who are immediately and directly injured to those whose
liability is established by some source other than foreseeability. 1 18
While it is true that secondary claims are allowed in most jurisdictions
for spousal consortium, wrongful death and emotional distress, recogni-
116. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 995 (Alaska 1987); see also
Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 519 (noting that in defering to the legislature, the court would be
shirking its responsibilities).
117. Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).




tion of those claims does not necessarily support the abandoning of
traditional tort concepts in favor of creating a consortium claim within
the parent-child context.
Compensating a secondary victim who views a tragic accident for his
or her emotional distress requires physical manifestations of injury as
well as the observer being physically present or in the "zone of dan-
ger." 119 With respect to parental-filial consortium, the child sitting in
school across town, or for that matter in an entirely different state, is
allowed to recover for injuries sustained solely by his or her parent. The
child has suffered no cognizable physical injury, yet is allowed to recover
in his or her own name against the tortfeasor. Thus, if parental-filial
claims are viewed as independent claims, recognition would seem to be
entirely contrary to the bounds of tort law and the reasons for their
existence. In the words ofJustice BenjaminJ. Cardozo in Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railroad, 12
0
the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation
to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to
the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not neg-
ligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that the fall-
ing package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed .... The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach
of duty to another.i
2 1
With respect to the analogy to wrongful death causes of action, it has
been pointed out that the policy considerations are different where a
victim is killed and therefore can bring no direct action of his own.
122
The wrongful death action serves as the only means by which the family
unit can recover compensation for the loss of parental care and services,
whereas when the parent or child lives, the tangible aspects of the child's
care can be compensated in an independent cause of action.1
2 3
Recognition of the parental-filial consortium claim also effectively
creates a tort claim and extends liability beyond the ordinary principles
of negligence, which limit recovery to those who are immediately in-
jured and liability to those for whom liability is established by some legal
source. 124 In essence, the spousal consortium claim, a legal idiosyn-
crasy, would be allowed to abrogate the sound principles of duty and
foreseeability. Recognition would necessarily create a cause of action
for psychic or emotional injury not accompanied by any actual or
threatened physical harm or any injury to another legally protected in-
terest. 12 5 In regard to the bounds of tort law, Judge Charles D. Breitel
119. Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978).
120. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
121. Id. at 99-100.
122. Schneider, supra note 43.
123. Id.
124. Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517 A.2d 1348, 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), allocatur
granted, 532 A.2d 437 (Pa. 1987), aff'd without opinion, 540 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1988).
125. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 327 (Or. 1982).
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of the Court of Appeals of New York in Tobin v. Grossman 12 6 wrote a
poignant and persuasive opinion wherein, with regard to emotional dis-
tress damages, he stated:
Beyond practical difficulties there is a limit to attaining essen-
tial justice in this area. While it may seem that there should be
a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by
the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying conse-
quences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The
problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks of indirect harm
from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and inevitably
realized at one time or another. Only a small part of that risk is
brought about by the culpable acts of others. This is the risk of
living and bearing children. It is enough that the law estab-
lishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally
harmed. 1
2 7
It is further instructive to note that in the context of actions not
brought by the primary victim, concerns about the uncertainty of the
intangible loss alleged and the inherent inadequacies of money damages
as compensation loom larger, especially since the primary victim may
also recover a sum for intangible, uncertain damages, i.e. pain and suf-
fering, etc. Additionally, it may not be far-fetched to say that the cost of
being a human being in a modern society could become too expensive,
since one negligent mistake could lead to a tort award not only to the
injured party but also to all those with whom he has relationships. Of
course there is insurance. The insurance company raises its premiums
and the public pays for the jury awards. It soon becomes too expensive
for the average person to obtain liability insurance. Taxation, prices
paid for consumer goods and medical service necessarily increase.'
2 8 If
the manufacturing industry is too adversely affected it could result in the
loss of jobs. 12 9 Suggestions are made that these factors should not
stand in the way of an enlightened tort system, which must be properly
administered in terms of natural justice.13 0 However, according to one
commentator, this is not necessarily true: "A sound and viable tort sys-
tem-generally what we now have-is a valuable incident to our free
society, but we must protect it from excess lest it become unworkable
and alas we find it replaced with something far from desirable."'
3 '
Of course, if compensation should prove too costly, the legislature
could also put a ceiling on the amount of damages recoverable, 13 2 as the
Colorado legislature has done in wrongful death actions for lost society
126. 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
127. Id. at 424.
128. See Guthrie, supra note 43, at 702.
129. Id. at 702.
130. See Love, supra note 25, at 604.
131. Guthrie, supra note 43, at 702 (citing Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517 A.2d 1348 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986)).
132. Id. at 702.
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and companionship.13 3 Nevertheless, once done, another secondary
victim will be allowed to recover and an additional ripple of tort law will
reverberate toward an unknown shore.
C. Children Should Be Fully Compensated For Direct Injuries
While the earlier consortium cases were consistent with English
common law dealing with master-servant relationships, the more recent
cases are simply not in step with modern trends. Very few minors at the
present time would be considered an economic asset. Under Colorado
law, when a child is negligently injured, medical expenses and past and
future earnings are recoverable by the parent who must bring an in-
dependent action. Thus, Colorado law has continued the antiquated
idea that the child is a servant of his or her parents and, like the servant
in common law, can only recover for his or her injuries. When a parent
is negligently injured, the child has no cause of action and, it is submit-
ted, needs none since any economic losses will be compensated in the
parent's own action. In both instances, however, the tortfeasor is held
liable for all damages cognizable under general tort principles. Accord-
ingly, Colorado courts simply need to address the issue that a minor, as
with any injured party, should be entitled to complete and full compen-
sation for his or her own losses. All earnings, during minority or follow-
ing emancipation, should be awarded to a child. Of course, these
earnings, as with any personal injury award, should be held in trust for
the minor. Applying such a formula would provide the child with the
same right of tort recovery as all other tort victims. Under this rule,
both parent and child would be entitled to obtain the fullest recovery
allowed within the proper boundaries of common law tort principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, derivative claims for consortium were premised upon
archaic views of master-servant and husband-wife relationships. Society
should no longer tolerate such views. Expansion of the concept of con-
sortium to include filial or parental claims merely continues this fiction.
As noted by Judge Breitel, the law today must recognize that, although
injuries impact many people, difficult and somewhat arbitrary lines must
be drawn.' 3 4 Direct injury to a child must be fully compensated. Simi-
larly, an injured parent should be entitled to recover in his or her own
action for the change he or she experiences in dealing with a child in the
form of expenses incurred in caring for the child. Derivative consortium
claims, however, should not be expanded. Such claims would necessar-
ily entail the abandonment of common law tort principles in favor of
extending liability for psychic injuries not accompanied by actual or
threatened physical harm. If such claims were recognized, liability
would be improperly extended from those who are immediately and di-
133. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-102.5(2)(b) and 203(l) (1991 Cum. Supp.).
134. See supra note 127.
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rectly injured and whose cause of action is established by foreseeability,
to those whose only connection with the accident is their fortuitous rela-
tionship with the primary victim. The tort concepts of duty and foresee-
ability and the reasons for which they exist would necessarily be
abandoned. Recognition would mean disregarding the fundamental
concepts which limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable
degree. In sum, the ripples from an injury must end if the tort system
that we find so valuable is to remain effective.
